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Abstract
Hash functions are used in information security applications for the generation and veriﬁcation of digital signatures, key derivation,
and pseudorandom bit generation. Hash algorithms are secure because, for a given algorithm, it is computationally infeasible to
ﬁnd a message that corresponds to a given message digest, or to ﬁnd two different messages that produce the same message
digest. Any change to a message will result in a different message digest with a very high probability. This will result in a
veriﬁcation failure when the secure hash algorithm is used with a digital signature algorithm or a keyed-hash message authentication
algorithm. In our work, ﬁrst we implemented the Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP), a hybrid MANET protocol is being implemented
in Network Simulator 2 (NS2) and hashing algorithm, keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code – Secure Hashing Algorithm 512
(HMAC-SHA512) is implemented for the Authentication and Data Integrity of the information being sent. In addition to that a
Trust-Based system is formulated for preventing the Denial-of-Services (DoS) Attacks. The ﬁrst part of this paper introduces the
HMAC-SHA512 for ensuring that the data packets are received by the destination only and in its original form but at the expense
of the increased processing time at the source and the destination. The second part uses the Trust-Based system with those nodes
that act maliciously being broadcasted in the network and isolated to render a higher throughput and packet delivery fraction but at
the expense of the increased end to end delay.
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1. Introduction
Hash algorithm can be described in two stages as preprocessing and hash computation. Preprocessing involves
padding a message, parsing the padded message into m-bit blocks, and setting initialization values to be used in
the hash computation. The hash computation generates a message schedule from the padded message and uses that
schedule, along with functions, constants, and word operations to iteratively generate a series of hash values. The ﬁnal
hash value generated by the hash computation is used to determine the message digest.
The security strengths of the hash functions are more effective if we use along with other cryptographic algorithms,
such as digital signature algorithms and keyed-hash message authentication codes1–21.
The message digests range in length from 160 to 512 bits, depending on the algorithm. Secure hash algorithms
are typically used with other cryptographic algorithms, such as digital signature algorithms and keyed-hash message
authentication codes, or in the generation of random numbers (bits).
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Table 1. Properties of secure hash algorithms.
Type of SHA algorithm Message size (bits) Block Size (bits) Word size (bits) Message digest size (bits)
SHA-1 <264 512 32 160
SHA-224 <264 512 32 224
SHA-384 <2128 1024 64 384
SHA-512 <2128 1024 64 512
SHA-512/224 <2128 1024 64 224
SHA-512/256 <2128 1024 64 256
In a mobile ad-hoc network environment, the information transmitting through the network must be saved from the
various security threats. Because of the dynamic nature of network topology, it is quite challenging to provide security
for routing. It is understandable that most security threats target routing protocols – the weakest point of the mobile
ad-hoc network. There are various studies and many researches in this ﬁeld in an attempt to propose more secure
protocols. However, there is not a complete routing protocol that can secure the operation of an entire network in every
situation. Typically a “secure” protocol is only good at protecting the network against one speciﬁc type of attacks.
Many researches have been done to evaluate the performance of secure routing protocols in comparison with normal
routing protocols. One of the objectives of this paper is to examine the additional cost of adding a security feature into
non-secure routing protocols in various scenarios. The additional cost may include delay in packet transmission, the
low rate of data packets over the total packets sent, etc.
In this paper, we implemented two secure routing techniques: HMAC-SHA512, a keyed-Hash Message
Authentication Code – Secure Hashing Algorithm 512 is used for Authentication and Data Integrity which uses a
secret key along with the hash function to send data from source to destination in a secure way and a Trust-Based
system that prevents the Denial-of-Services (DoS) Attacks in the Network Simulator 2 (NS2) simulation environments
in Ubuntu 13.10, Linux Operating System (OS). Scenarios are created with malicious nodes and implement attacks
in the simulation environments and measure the performance parameters of the network with different zone radius,
pause time and increasing the number of mobile nodes along with the malicious nodes.
2. Security in Zone Routing Protocol
The main objective of this paper is to implement a cryptographic and trust based system to enhance the security
of the ZRP so that the communication between the source and the destination can be made secure along with the
additional security of the intermediates nodes. The secondary objective is to analyze how the added features affect the
performance of the system when simulated and if the trade-off between the various parameters do result in enhanced
efﬁciency or just increases the cost of the system. The ﬁnal results will give an insight that how different parameters
can be modiﬁed to get the desired results for the network in real time.
3. Security Features
Encryption guarantees only the conﬁdentiality of the message being sent. Digital signature is an authentication
mechanism that enables the source message to attach a code which acts as a signature. It is created by taking the hash
of the message and encrypting the message with the creator’s private key. It provides the security goals which are
message integrity, authentication and non-repudiation.
The requirements for a Digital signature are: a) it must be a bit pattern that depends on the message being signed.
b) it must be computationally infeasible to forge a digital signature, either by constructing a new message for an
existing digital signature or by constructing a fraudulent digital signature for a given message.
In direct digital signature, it is assumed that the destination node knows the public key of the source node. A digital
signature is generated by encrypting the entire message with the sender’s private key or by encrypting a hash code of the
message with the sender’s private key. Conﬁdentiality is achieved by encrypting the entire message plus signature with
either the receiver’s public key (public-key encryption) or a shared secret key (symmetric encryption). Hash function
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Fig. 1. Message digest generation using SHA-512.
is applied in Digital signature for message authentication. The length of the hash code gives the strength of a hash
function against brute-force attacks. Hash function has one-way property that for a given value h, it is computationally
infeasible to ﬁnd x such that H (x) = h.
SHA-512 is used to hash a message, M , having a length of ‘l’ bits, where 0 ≤ l < 2128. In SHA-512, each message
block has 1024 bits and they are represented as a sequence of sixteen 64-bit words. The algorithm uses 1) a message
schedule of eighty 64-bit words, 2) eight working variables of 64 bits each, and 3) a hash value of eight 64-bit words.
The ﬁnal result of SHA-512 is a 512-bit message digest.
3.1 SHA-512 preprocessing
Preprocessing consists of three steps: padding the message, M , parsing the message into message blocks, and
setting the initial hash value, H (0).
Step 1: The purpose of the padding is to ensure that the padded message is a multiple of 1024 bits. Padding can be
inserted before hash computation begins on a message, or at any other time during the hash computation prior to
processing the block(s) that will contain the padding.
Step 2: The message and its padding must be parsed into Nm-bit blocks.
For Fig. 2 SHA-512, the message and its padding are parsed into N 1024-bit blocks, M(1), M(2), M(3) . . . M(N) . Since
the 1024 bits of the input block may be expressed as sixteen 64-bit words, the ﬁrst 64 bits of message block i are




2 . . . M
(i)
15 .
Step 3: Set the initial hash value, H (0).
For SHA-512, the initial hash value, H (0), shall consist of the following eight 64-bit words, in hex:
H (0)0 = 6a09e667f3bcc908 H (0)1 = bb67ae8584caa73b H (0)2 = 3c6ef372fe94f82b H (0)3 = a54ff53a5f1d36f1
H (0)4 = 510e527fade682d1 H (0)5 = 9b05688c2b3e6c1f H (0)6 = 1f83d9abfb41bd6b H (0)7 = 5be0cd19137e2179
These words were obtained by taking the ﬁrst sixty-four bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the ﬁrst
eight prime numbers.
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Fig. 2. SHA-512 processing of a single 1024-Bit block.
The words of the message schedule are labeled as W1, W2, W3, . . . , W79. The eight working variables are labeled
a, b, c, d , e, f , g, and h. The words of the hash value are labeled H (i)0 , H (i)1 , . . . , H (i)7 which will hold the initial hash
value, H (0), replaced by each successive intermediate hash value (after each message block is processed), H (i), and
ending with the ﬁnal hash value, H (N). SHA-512 also uses two temporary words, T1 and T2.
SHA-512 use six logical functions, where each function operates on 64-bit words, which are represented as x , y,
and z. The result of each function is a new 64-bit word.
Ch(x, y, z) = (xˆy) ⊕ (∼ xˆz) Maj(x, y, z) = (xˆy) ⊕ (xˆz) ⊕ (yˆz)
{512}∑
0
x = ROT R28(x) ⊕ ROT R34(x) ⊕ ROT R39(x)
{512}∑
0
x = ROT R14(x) ⊕ ROT R18(x) ⊕ ROT R41(x)
σ
{512}
0 (x) = ROT R1(x) ⊕ ROT R8(x) ⊕ SH R7(x) σ {512}1 (x) = ROT R19(x) ⊕ ROT R61(x) ⊕ SH R6(x)




2 , . . . , K
{512}
79 . These words
represent the ﬁrst sixty-four bits of the fractional parts of the cube roots of the ﬁrst eighty prime numbers.
3.2 SHA-512 hash computations
Each message block, M(1), M(2), . . . , M(N) , is processed in order, using the following steps:
For i = 1 to N :
{
1. Prepare the message schedule, {Wt }:
Wt = M(i)t 0 ≤ t ≤ 15
= σ {512}1 (Wt−2) + Wt−7 + σ {512}0 (Wt−15) + Wt−16 16 ≤ t ≤ 79
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Fig. 3. Elementary SHA-512 operation (single round).
2. Initialize the eight working variables, a, b, c, d , e, f , g, and h, with the (i − 1)st hash value:
a = H (i−1)0 b = H (i−1)1 c = H (i−1)2 d = H (i−1)3 e = H (i−1)4 f = H (i−1)5 g = H (i−1)6 h = H (i−1)7
3. For t = 0 to 79:
{
T1 = h +
{512}∑
1












a = T1 + T2
}
4. Compute the i th intermediate hash value H (i):
H (i)0 = a + H (i−1)0 H (i)1 = b + H (i−1)1 H (i)2 = c + H (i−1)2 H (i)3 = d + H (i−1)3
H (i)4 = e + H (i−1)4 H (i)5 = f + H (i−1)5 H (i)6 = g + H (i−1)6 H (i)7 = h + H (i−1)7
}
After repeating steps one through four a total of N times (i.e., after processing M(N)), the resulting 512-bit message
digest of the message, M , is H (N)0 |H (N)1 |H (N)2 |H (N)3 |H (N)4 H (N)5 |H (N)6 |H (N)7 .
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4. Trust Based System
This system in addition to the cryptographic based system provides additional security to the network. It identiﬁes
the malicious nodes in the network and differentiates them from the trusted nodes. For every node, a timer is initiated
while it transfers the data. The trust value of the participating nodes is increased for every successful transmission and
decreased for those nodes that do not send the data towards the destination. Their trust value is decreased and at a
certain threshold, they are deemed malicious. These malicious nodes are further broadcasted in the network to other
friendly nodes so that the defective node can be isolated in the network and as a result its throughput, pdf and e2e
delay is affected as no services are rendered for these malicious nodes.
Sender sends a packet and overhears the route to conﬁrm the delivery. If the packet is delivered then, a value of ‘1’
is assigned else a value of ‘0’ in case of no delivery.
Trust Value = (Sum of ‘1’ or ‘0’)/Total Sent Packets
If, Trust Value < Decided Threshold, node under consideration is blacklisted and broadcasted malicious. For
conﬁrming a delivery, a timer is maintained and if timer is out then the node is blacklisted 11.
5. Result Analysis
In this section, we analyze the results of the SZRP implementation in NS2 simulation environment starting from
the HMAC-SHA512 incorporation in the ﬁrst part and then moving on to the incorporation of Trust-Based system.
We vary the number of nodes from ‘10 nodes’ to ‘50 nodes’ in steps of ‘10’ and change the zone radius from ‘1’ to ‘5’.
As we also consider an extra feature of mobility in the MANETs, we vary the pause time from ‘10 s’ to ‘50 s’ in steps
of ‘10’.
5.1 HMAC-SHA512 implementation
In this we analyze the output of the HMAC-SHA512 algorithm as discussed in section 3 in the CodeBlocks IDE in
the Ubuntu 13.10 OS. Here for the illustration. The data is taken to be: Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University
Secret Key: Electronics
Result: HMAC-SHA512 = 884363DC 450E49C8 591E931A 9AC36012 DBD7094F B35EB519 866842FC
F1937DB2 568351DF 6C0857E4 F85E4920 E7493549 0161D905 B79CEDFD 780DD0FE 6F11D22C
5.2 ZRP Analysis (with HMAC-SHA512)
For the implementation point of view we use the ZRP patch in ns-2.33-allinone package. It is a version of NS2.
We further analyze the performance of the secure ZRP (with HMAC-SHA512 implementation) and compare it at
different zone radius keeping the number of nodes to be constant.
The results of the conventional ZRP and with HMAC-SHA512 can be seen in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively. The
performance parameters are Throughput, Packet Delivery Fraction and End-to-End Delay.
Looking at the above Tables 2 and 3, we can conclude that at radius = 1, the protocol is reactive or demand driven
and hence many hops are required to send the data to the destination that results in lower throughput and pdf but higher
Table 2. Performance parameters of conventional ZRP.
Throughput (Th) [in Kbps] Packet delivery fraction (pdf) End-to-end delay (e2e delay) [in ms]
Radius = 1 17.70 0.7917 1360.4
Radius = 2 176.67 0.8893 915.261
Radius = 3 81.72 0.7784 985.488
Radius = 4 77.56 0.7764 856.958
Radius = 5 52.66 0.8000 961.525
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Table 3. Performance parameters of ZRP with HMAC-SHA512.
Throughput (Th) [in Kbps] Packet delivery fraction (pdf) End-to-end delay (e2e delay) [in ms]
Radius = 1 12.05 0.7037 1820.27
Radius = 2 154.29 0.9550 1927.14
Radius = 3 96.36 0.9241 2016.95
Radius = 4 68.04 0.9129 1909.89
Radius = 5 54.08 0.9126 2101.46
Table 4. Simulation parameters.
Source node 4
Destination node 17
Simulator NS - 2.33
Protocol ZRP
Type of Attack Packet Dropping
Duration 50 s
Simulation Area 1000m × 1000m
Propagation Model Two Ray Ground Reﬂection
Number of nodes 20
Channel Wireless
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11
Antenna Omnidirectional
Interface Queue size 50 Packets
Mobility Model Random way Point
Pause Time 10 s
Zone Radius 2
Number of connections 18 CBR (TCP)




e2e delay. For radius from ‘2’ to ‘5’, we can see that the throughput is decreasing because the proactive approach gets
predominant and has to fan out more and more nodes in the zone but this approach reduces the e2e delay and can be
veriﬁed from the table.
In comparison to conventional ZRP, the SZRP has a higher delay because of the extra time taken for the
HMAC-SHA512 processing.
5.3 ZRP analysis (with HMAC-SHA512 and trust-based system)
With HMAC-SHA512 implemented into the ZRP patch in NS2, the next step is to incorporate the Trust-Based
system in the ZRP for the prevention of DoS attacks. For this analysis, the simulation is done for different number of
nodes from 10 to 50 and varying the zone radius from 1 to 5. As MANETs consist of mobile network, the pause time
that deﬁnes the mobility is varied from 10 s to 50 s in steps of 10 s.
5.3.1 Effect of malicious nodes on the network
With the above parameters, the analysis is done and the Packet Delivery Fraction is evaluated as given in Table 5.
From Table 5, we can conclude that when the malicious node percentage reaches around 30, there is a sharp decrease
in the Packet Delivery Fraction. Thus, the tolerable limit of malicious node is less than 30% without having much of
an effect on the performance of the network.
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Table 6. Simulation parameters.
Protocol ZRP
Type of Attack Packet Dropping
Duration 50 s
Simulation Area 1000m × 1000m
Propagation Model Two ray Ground Reﬂection
Number of nodes 50
Channel Wireless
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11
Antenna Omnidirectional
Interface Queue 50 Packets
Mobility Model Random way Point
Pause Time 20 s
Zone Radius 5
Number of connections 90 CBR (TCP)




Table 7. Analysis of trust-based system.
W/O trust With trust
E2E delay E2E delay
MALC % TH (kbps) (ms) PDF TH (kbps) (ms) PDF
0 358.12 154.982 0.9404 352.16 188.173 0.9625
10 352.23 192.198 0.8218 345.29 255.254 0.9216
20 344.18 205.260 0.7414 354.43 256.216 0.7548
30 338.14 224.141 0.6816 348.44 344.249 0.7224
40 294.22 242.162 0.5207 338.83 318.853 0.7251
50 189.18 267.154 0.3564 335.66 320.481 0.6028
5.3.2 Analysis of ZRP (with trust based system)
Moving on to the second part of the project, we want to analyze that how the trust based system improves the
performance of the network. Thus for the analysis we take the following parameters and do the comparison between
the trust and without trust based system.
With the above parameters, the analysis is done and the performance parameters are evaluated as given in Table 7.
From Table 7, we can see that the Packet Delivery fraction of the ZRP without trust when compared to that of with
trust, the one with the trust based system performs better as it takes into consideration of the malicious nodes in the
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Table 8. Simulation parameters.
Source 2
Destination 23
Simulator NS – 2.33
Protocol ZRP
Type of Attack Packet Dropping
Duration 50 s
Simulation Area 1000m × 1000m
Propagation Model Two ray Ground Reﬂection
Number of nodes 50
Channel Wireless
MAC Protocol IEEE 802.11
Antenna Omnidirectional
Interface Queue 50 Packets
Mobility Model Random way Point
Pause Time 20 s, 50 s
Zone Radius 3
Number of connections 54 CBR (TCP)




Table 9. Performance Parameters of SZRP (pause time = 20 s).
W/O trust With trust
E2E delay E2E delay
MALC % TH (kbps) (ms) PDF TH (kbps) (ms) PDF
10 282.72 143.267 0.6566 422.62 242.126 0.7682
20 363.55 174.309 0.5634 382.12 240.181 0.6281
30 324.32 159.867 0.4286 286.18 266.342 0.5485
40 308.38 162.105 0.3526 488.86 288.482 0.5204
50 472.41 184.639 0.3008 388.58 286.847 0.3384
network. The initial PDF is never 100% as some packets are lost due to mobility. Thus the ZRP with trust rather than
taking the shortest path also takes into consideration the behavior of the nodes.
From the Table 7, we can see that the end to end delay for the trust based system increases as the time taken to
traverse the same distance (in hops) increases as compared to the conventional ZRP without trust.
Finally, from Table 7, we expect the Throughput to increase for the trust based system but as mobility and alternative
path of communication comes into picture, the Throughput shows deviation from the theoretical results.
Pause time deﬁnes the mobility of the network and thus for the analysis of pause time on the network at a particular
zone radius, we take the following parameters.
Keeping the above parameters, the analysis is done and the performance is evaluated as given in Table 9 (for pause
time = 20 s) and Table 10 (for pause time = 50 s).
Analyzing the Table 9 and Table 10, we see that with the increase of the pause time, the network gets more stabilized
and thus the Throughput and the Packet Delivery Fraction increases but as expected, the pause time should decrease
the end to end delay but in this case, there is an increase in that parameter which is because of the random way point
mobility model used for the generation of the scenario ﬁle for doing the analysis. This causes the changes in the initial
co-ordinates of the node and their movement in the two cases with different pause time and hence the deviation from
the expected result.
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Table 10. Performance Parameters of SZRP (pause time = 50 s).
W/O trust With trust
E2E delay E2E delay
MALC % TH (kbps) (ms) PDF TH (kbps) (ms) PDF
10 639.58 240.565 0.8427 804.63 304.349 0.8844
20 731.22 212.004 0.7493 784.09 315.688 0.7824
30 744.89 234.698 0.6504 746.42 386.855 0.6842
40 703.9 262.161 0.596 754.44 394.424 0.6828
50 745.14 267.037 0.570 726.95 358.483 0.6287
6. Conclusion and Future Scope
In our work, the routing approach in mobile ad hoc networks with respect to the security is considered and analyzed
the various threats against hybrid routing in ad hoc networks and proposed the requirements which are essential to
be addressed for secure routing. In this paper two techniques namely HMAC-SHA512 for providing data integrity
along with authentication and Trust-Based system to make the network more secure by preventing Denial of Service
attacks in the network are used. Our proposed protocol reaches a better result towards accomplishing the security goals
such as message integrity and message authentication, by taking an uniﬁed approach of digital signature. Along with
cryptography based solutions, a Trust Based solution is also implemented which is based on the deportment of the
nodes.
The ﬁrst part of the paper is implementation of HMAC-SHA512 on to the existing ZRP which provides us
data integrity and authentication but at the expense of the increased processing delay. The other part being the
implementation of the Trust Based system that considers the malicious nodes of the network and tries to avoid them
as these nodes affects the Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF). The Trust Based system increases the PDF but at the
expense of the increased End to End Delay. The simulations further show that as the malicious nodes percentage goes
past 30%, the performance of the system degrades considerably. Furthermore, the mobility plays an important role
while analyzing the network. If the pause time is increased, the mobility decreases that leads to more stable networks.
Therefore, SZRP is an efﬁcient way of discovering and maintaining routes in an open environment.
The future possible extension of our work may include employing additional feature to SZRP so that it can handle
a scenario where the data is also conﬁdential between the source and the destination and there are some safeguards
against any attack to the data privacy (conﬁdentiality). This implementation will increase the scope of the project
to the military level operations where we need the security as well as privacy against the eavesdropping attacks.
In addition one can implement a secure – key exchange mechanism so that multiple nodes can communicate in the
network simultaneously in a secure manner without the prior knowledge to the secret key amongst the source ‘S’ and
Destination ‘D’.
References
[1] FIPS PUB 180-4 Secure Hash Standard (SHS), Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900, March (2012).
[2] Jeroen Hoebeke, Ingrid Moerman, Bart Dhoedt and Piet Demeester, Towards Adaptive Ad Hoc Network Routing, IJWMC, issue 2/3, (2005).
[3] Yuki Sato, Akio Koyama and Leonard Barolli, A Zone Based Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks and its Performance Improvement by
Reduction of Control Packets, 2010 International Conference on Broadband, Wireless Computing, Communication and Applications, ISBN:
978-0-7695-4236-2, IEEE Computer Society, November 04–November 06 (2010).
[4] Amit Kumar Jaiswal and Pardeep Singh, New Scheme of Adaptive Zone Routing Protocol, International Journal of Computer Science &
Communication, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 207–210, July-December (2010).
[5] Niroj Kumar Pani, A Secure Zone-based Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, Thesis Report, Department of Computer Science
and Engineering, National Institute of Technology, Rourkela, Orissa 769 008, India, May (2009).
[6] Venugopalan Ramasubramanian, Zygmunt J. Haas and Emin Gu¨n Sirer, SHARP: A Hybrid Adaptive Routing Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc
Networks, MobiHoc’03, Annapolis, Maryland, USA, June 1–3, 2003.
206   Dilli Ravilla and Chandra Shekar Reddy Putta /  Procedia Computer Science  54 ( 2015 )  196 – 206 
[7] Siddhartha Gupte and Mukesh Singhal, Secure Routing in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks, Ad Hoc Networks, vol. 1, pp. 151–174,
(2003). www.elsevier.com/locate/adhoc
[8] Saud Rugeish Alotaibi, Stability of Secure Routing Protocol in Ad hoc wireless Network, Ph.D. Thesis Faculty of Technology De Montfort
University United Kingdom, England (2010).
[9] Z. J. Haas, M. R. Pearlman and P. Samar, The Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP), IETF Internet Draft, draft-ietf-manet-zone-zrp-04.txt, July
(2002).
[10] Z. J. Haas, M. R. Pearlman and P. Samar, Intrazone Routing Protocol, IETF Internet Draft, draft-ietf-manet-iarp-01.txt, June (2001).
[11] Z. J. Haas, M. R. Pearlman and P. Samar, Interzone Routing Protocol, IETF Internet Draft, draft-ietf-manet-ierp-01.txt, June (2001).
[12] Z. J. Haas, M. R. Pearlman and P. Samar, The Bordercast Resolution Protocol (BRP) for Ad Hoc Networks, IETF Internet Draft,
draft-ietf-manet-brp-01.txt, June (2001).
[13] Stefano Basagni, Macro Conti, G. Silvia and S. Ivan, Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE Press, A John Wily & Sons, INC. Publication, (2003).
[14] C. Siva Ram Murthy and B. S Manoj, Ad Hoc Wireless Networks, Architecture and Protocols, Prentice Hall PTR, (2004).
[15] L. Zhou and Z. J Haas, Securing Ad Hoc Networks, IEEE Network Magazine, December (1999).
[16] M. O. Pervaiz, M. Cardei and J. Wu, Routing Security in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks, Network Security, S. Huang, D. MacCallum and
D.-Z. Du (eds.), Springer, (2008).
[17] Gabriel Montenegro and Claude Castelluccia, Crypto-Based Identiﬁers (CBIDs): Concepts and Applications ACM Transactions on
Information and System Security, February (2004).
[18] S. Neelavathy, P. Sbrish Jayapal and D. Sridharan, A Trust Security in MANETwith Secure Key Authentication Mechanism, ICRTIT, (2012).
[19] E. R. Yasser, N. Laila and Imane Aly Saroit, Enhancing Security of Zone Based Routing Protocol using Trust, INFOS, May (2012).
[20] Hu, Yih-Chun, Adrian Perrig and Dave Johnson, Rushing Attacks and Defense in Wireless Ad Hoc Network Routing Protocols, In Proc.
ACM Workshop on Wireless Security, San Diego, WiSe, California, September (2003).
[21] Marc Greis, Tutorial for the Network Simulators. http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/tutorial/index.html.
